Language and Metaphysics (Level 7)

• Credit value: 30 credits at Level 7
• Convenor: Dr Florian Steinberger
• Assessment: a 2000-word essay (40%) and a 2500-word essay (60%)

A motivating idea behind many theories of linguistic meaning is that understanding a (declarative) sentence is knowing its ‘truth conditions’: that is, what the world would have to be like for the sentence to be true. This idea suggests a close connection between language and reality that has motivated work in both the philosophy of language and metaphysics since the end of the nineteenth century. In this module we explore the connection by examining the mechanisms by which words designate objects in the world and what those objects must be like for us to make true claims about them, addressing a selection of questions such as: In virtue of what does the use of a proper name, such as ‘Sarah’, pick out a single individual bearing that name? Do names have a meaning apart from their function of designating specific individuals? If ‘Hamlet is a Dane’ is true, does that mean that Hamlet exists? How do we determine whether something exists? Are there different existence and identity conditions corresponding to different kinds of objects, such as material, social or fictional objects? In addressing these and other questions, this module will introduce you to classic arguments by such philosophers as Frege, Russell and Kripke, as well as to contemporary approaches.

Indicative module content

• Semantic content
• Theories of proper names
• Definite descriptions
• Causal theories of reference
• Existence and nonexistence
• Identity conditions
• Material objects
• Social objects
• Fictional objects

By the end of this module, you will be able to:

• understand different accounts of reference and intentionality, as well as their interrelationships with other topics in philosophy of language and metaphysics
• understand different ideas, contexts and frameworks deployed by contributors to debates over the meanings and functions of proper names; their strengths and weaknesses; and their relevance to broader questions about meaning and reality
• critically respond to different philosophical theories of reference and truth conditions, suggesting new concepts and approaches
• critically challenge philosophical accounts of intentionality, identity, objecthood and existence, while situating these in relation to discourse and thought.